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It should not come as a shock to point out that "pro-life" and "pro-choice" 
advocates display little in common regarding their moral stances on issues of 
unborn life. Ironically, however, they often do have one important thing in 
common: confusions regarding the principles governing the relation of people's 
moral views to law, that is, confusions regarding the relationship of individual 
morality to public policy. This article will explore that relation as it has been 
articulated in the classical western tradition, especially as explicated by Aquinas 
and certain contemporary authors, with a view to gleaning a few general 
principles which could serve as a focus for determining what law ought, and 
ought not, to regulate with regard to abortion. 
Law 
Law has two major purposes in this tradition. First, its object is to foster the 
good life in positive ways in order to assure what is necessary for the achievement 
of the common good of society. This is the realm corresponding to "general" or 
"legal" justice. i 
Secondly, the object oflaw is to try to get people to act reasonably with regard 
to others in their private affairs, and also to ensure that all have equal, if 
proportional, rights to participate in the public goods of society. This is the realm 
of "particular" justice, and it comes close to what the Second Vatican Council's 
"Declaration on Religious Liberty" articulated as being necessary to secure the 
public order, which consists of three elements: the order of justice which 
safeguards both the individual and social rights of individuals, the order of peace 
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which enables people to live together in harmony, and the order of public morality, 
which fosters those moral principles or virtues which are minimally necessary for 
the common life.2 Law achieves the good of public order by two interrelated means: 
by restraining people from doing flagrantly unjust things to each other it creates an 
atmosphere of freedom from harm that is necessary for life in an ordered society, 
and pedagologically it fosters those basic human virtues -particularly those allied 
with justice - that are positively necessary if social life is going to flourish. The 
following will focus on this second purpose of law, that of securing the public order 
by restraining people from evil and fostering in them basic moral principles by these 
twin means of coercion and pedagogy. 
Before we take up the question of the limits oflaw's coercive power, it should be 
noted that what we call the classical understanding of law - that which has 
dominated Western thought up to the advent of modernity - has its roots in the 
ancient Greek vision of the relation between virtue and the good life. In this classical 
view human beings were actually intended to become righteous by obedience to 
society'S laws. There was here an awareness that virtue and prosperity correspond; 
the polis, in actively fostering the virtuous life of its citizens, was by that very reason 
fostering the common good of society, which makes a good and happy life possible.3 
Even in the classical vision, however, the role of the state, and hence also of its laws, 
was limited in scope. The ancients thus made the distinction between individual and 
political prudence, a distinction which delimited two different realms of ethics; they 
realized that it was not in all cases politically prudent to legislate or effect what was 
indeed prudent conduct for individuals. Political ethics thus did not correspond to 
individual ethics. This does not mean, as John Dolan points out, that the purpose of 
law is not moral (it is), but only "that its moral purpose is limited."4 In this vision, the 
role of the society was to legislate ethically right conduct, to be sure, but only as 
required for the protection of the public good, which meant, among other things, 
that the state was only directly concerned with certain virtuous - particularly just 
- actions, rather than in an ethically right virtuous mode of those actions. 
This idea was developed and systematized in late classical and particularly 
medieval and early Renaissance Christian thought. The distinction was drawn 
between the virtue of legal justice, whose purpose was to direct actions to the 
common good by either making or obeying law, and particular justice, whose 
object was the realization of equality between individuals (in the case of 
commutative justice), or between society and individuals (in the case of distributive 
justice). Since legal justice includes reference to the divine and natural (or moral) 
laws as well as to civil law, its objects are all those things which are due to oneself or 
another, that is, all those things which are reasonable. It includes, in other words, 
both what is morally due and what is legally due. 
Particular justice, on the other hand, in the strict sense requires only those 
reasonable actions which are due to another as determined by civil legislation, that 
is, only those actions which are strictly necessary for the realization of that basic 
equality that is itself necessary for the realization of the common good of temporal 
society. It does not include, strictly speaking, all actions that are reasonable, or all 
actions that are morally due to another. The legal due is and must be possible 
to enforce, and always concerns only outward action; the moral 
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due, which includes such actions as religious worship, respect for parents, 
truth-telling, gratitude, etc., is neither legally due nor particularly easy to enforce. 
Coercion. Only the virtue of justice directly interests civil law because it is 
proper to justice to perfect us in relation to others. And in regard to justice, civil 
law directly commands or restrains only external actions, for these are the proper 
matter of justice; law, then, is not directly concerned with the heart, with people's 
motivations for doing just actions. Nor is its concern directly with the acts of other 
virtues, such as temperance and courage, or those virtues which fall short of the 
full notion of justice, such as religion, gratitude, and truth-telling. Civil law 
directly aims at only one part ofthe moral order, the good of justice, whereby our 
actions are regulated with respect to other individuals and the common good. As 
Dolan says, a person's "individual moral integrity is of no immediate interest to 
the law except as it touches onjustice."5 The law may want me to be temperate 
and brave, for instance, but its concern is not my personal moral integrity, but 
rather that I not "become publicly drunk or panic in battle. "6 In other words, its 
concerns are my actions as they affect others and the common good, rather than 
the internal source of those actions. 
There are limitations even within this circumscribed area to what law can 
accomplish by commanding/restraining. It is limited first by the necessity that 
most people must, at least in a general way, consent to the law. Law is 
unenforcable and hopelessly coercive if it runs counter to what the majority 
believe to be right. The second limitation of law - not completely 
distinguishable from the first - concerns what is often called the "utility" or 
"possibility" oflaw. Law must be able to be equitably enforced without causing 
other types of harm. As Aquinas put it, "human law is said to permit certain 
things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them."7 The example 
he used - as did Augustine before him - was prostitution.s Another example 
would be American prohibition, which went a long way toward creating 
organized crime in this country, and also a cultural backlash in which drinking 
was seen to be a status symbol. 
Aquinas9 noted also that the realm of law must be limited to the ordinary 
virtue possible to the majority of people. Dolan reflects this understanding as 
follows: 
Laws must be such as the majority of men find relatively easy to obey, which means their 
aim must be modest, just as the majority of men are of modest virtue. The state must be 
satisfied with containing passion and appetite within limits that keep them from 
accomplishing notable harm to the common good. The justice demanded by law will 
always fall below natural, not to say Christian,justice . .. While all law implies the need 
for coercion, it cannot coerce a whole community without provoking disaffection.1o 
He continues by usefully summarizing these reflections on the limitations of civil 
law: 
16 
The legislating of natural [or moral] law must be modified as a matter of principle and 
not mere exped.iency (or, more exactly, by expediency as a matter of principle), by the 
moral and phYSical freedom of the members within the body politic. To the first of these 
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corresponds the canon of consent or the right ofthe people to ratify its law. To the second 
corresponds the cannon of utility (or 'possibility') which confines the province of law to 
what it can usefully exact, all things considered (the customary morality especially), in 
the way of conduct affecting the common good. I I 
Thus M. Kathleen Kaveny writes that, for Aquinas, "the limits of criminal 
sanctions are the limits of ordinary virtue. The more purely pedagogical features 
of law will have to take over from there."12 
Pedagogy. We now move on to the second means by which society secures the 
public order: the task of inculcating virtue and concern for the common good 
through legislation. Through its pedagogical function, law fosters moral 
principles in at least three ways: 
1) By forcing people to act well in view of the common good, law habituates 
them to good action: 
Since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to 
words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, 
at least, they might desist from evildoing, and leave others in peace, and that they 
themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what 
hitherto they did from fear, and thus become wirtuous.13 
2) By actively promoting virtuous acts (through such things as tax breaks for 
married couples and charitable contributions). 
3) By helping people to take counsel, that is, by helping people to decide for 
themselves what is the best course of action (perhaps by legislating mandatory 
waiting periods and disseminating information on alternatives to abortion). 
But again, even the pedagogical purpose of civil law is limited by its direct 
concern with those aspects of morality that are minimally necessary to the public 
order: moral principles, for instance, concerning the respect for the rights of 
others, the importance of keeping one's promises, respect for marriage as a 
prerequisite for stable family life, a sense of obligation and loyalty to society at 
large, respect for law itself, etc. 
Besides the coercive and pedagogical purposes of law, two other factors are 
necessary to consider in the classical understanding of the role oflaw: its stability 
(or lack or it), and the obligation to obey unjust laws. 
Stability. It has long been recognized that for laws to be effective, they must be 
respected, and that an important ingredient in respect is stability. Laws that are 
too readily changed simply lose some of their sociological force which stems from 
their perceived inevitability: thing just are this way, so one must adapt to them, 
and obey them. As Aquinas put it, (long before the advent of modern sociological 
insight): 
Human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common 
good. But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the 
common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws . . . 
Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, in so 
August, 1996 17 
far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in 
some way or other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the 
harm done in this respect.14 
This must be a major consideration in forming a consensus with regard to 
abortion laws: where there is no consensus, laws are unlikely to be stable. 
Unjust Laws. Aquinas, for one, pulled no punches in characterizing unjust 
laws: they are to be considered acts of violence, rather than oflaw. And hence he 
holds that they do not bind in conscience. IS A caveat immediately follows, 
however: we might indeed be bound to obey them, in order to avoid greater 
harms, such as those that would stem from a generalized disrespect for law, from 
the advent of an unacceptable amount of violence directed against the innocent, 
or even anarchy. And here great prudence is called for: one must weigh the evil 
effects of obeying (or at least of not actively fighting) an unjust law against the 
possible effects of civil disobedience. One must ask oneself such question as: 
- How great is the injustice stemming from the law? 
- Is the unjust law the exception, or the rule, in a given society? 
- What would be the overall effects on the common good were one to 
disobey this law? 
Richard Gula cogently delineates the following seven principles which should 
guide any decision for civil disobedience: I) One must be ready to assume the 
penalty for the law's violation. In other words, one "must be convinced that the 
harm brought to oneself is less than the harm being perpetrated by following the 
law." 2) It is to be done in the name of the law. "It is oriented toward reforming 
the law in order to protect the public order." 3). It is always the last resort, "only 
after others ways of bringing the wrong to public attention have been tried" and 
found ineffective. 4) It must grow "out of analysis of some specific wrong," rather 
than out of a negative reaction to the established order. 5) It should respect the 
Christian bias in favor of non-violence, because "since violent means are so 
destructive and so difficult to control, they can too easily go beyond the intended 
objectives and undermine the values being upheld." 6) One works within the 
structures of society in the attempt to reform them; civil disobedience is not 
revolution. "Accepting the appropriate penalty for violating the law is an 
example of respecting the structures of the community." 7) After the disobedient 
action, one must "work to heal the disruption in the community and help to 
create the structures which will correct the wrong." One further criterion might 
be that the law that is directly disobeyed must be unjust - the end does not justify 
the means. for example, blocking the Golden Gate bridge to protest the war in 
Vietnam is wrong because the laws ensuring free use of the bridge to all people is 
not itself unjust.16 
It would be appropriate to end this section with Isodore's description oflaw, 
quoted affirmatively by Aquinas: 
18 
~w shaH be virtuo~,just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, 
SUitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead 
to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit but for the common good.11 
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Abortion 
Most Roman Catholic moral theologians agree that the position of the 
Supreme Court in Roe v Wode (and several other subsequent decisions) is simply 
untenable, from both the legal and ethical points of view. A fundamental equality 
is violated by direct abortion. Unborn human lives, virtually everyone agrees, 
need some kind oflegal protection: but the critical question is, what kind? Given 
that individual human life is the subject of certain basic rights, how do we protect 
and enforce those rights? 
There are at least four characteristics of law that must be taken into 
consideration in the debate about abortion: 1) One oflaw's central purposes is to 
protect the innocent against injustice, especially their rights to life, bodily 
integrity, and freedom. 2) But law also deals with the realm of the possible. It 
must reflect some kind of consensus of society. If laws were imposed on large 
dissenting groups, they would be unenforcable, and lead to a general contempt 
for law. This unenforcability is exacerbated in the case of abortion both by the 
ease of some new techniques for abortion which do not require outside help, and 
by general unwillingness in society to punish people for that type of crime. As 
people are punished, a backlash could be created in favor of abortion. 3) In spite 
of this, law has an pedagogical role; it must coax people to gain a moral respect 
for basic principles of justice. This was especially effective in civil rights 
legislation. 4) Yet it also constrains with the threat of force: it uses and must use 
criminal penalties to protect rights. 
The problem with designing public policy with regard to abortion is the 
problem of balancing these four aspects oflaw. Although it is not possible to give 
a systematic presentation of all the issues pertaining to abortion law here, six 
points relevant to the issue will be mentioned. 
One. The main aim of public policy should be to make abortions as 
unnecessary as possible. In other words, the best way to prevent abortion is to 
have viable alternatives to abortion readily available to all women. We must 
think seriously about effective sex education, day care, easy adoption procedures, 
emotional and financial support to young women willing to COCle to term, etc. 
Two. Kaveny says that 
First, good abortion law must be consistent with the view that abortion constitutes the 
killing of a being which is fully human from very early on in pregnancy. Like other types 
of killing, it may objectively be justified in certain instances and mercifully pardoned in 
others. In the vast majority of the cases, however, it is an action which is objectively 
unjustified and is therefore strongly to be discouraged. Secondly, any acknowledgment 
of the objective wrongness of abortion must have as its counterpoint utmost sensiti~ity t? 
the difficulties facing women who confront unplanned pregnancy and parenthood 10 thIS 
society. These difficulties often seem insuperable because our society does not treat with 
gentleness the weak or vulnerable at any stage in life.18 
Kaveny goes on to draw a threefold distinction concerning what one's stance 
- in this case the stance of civil law - toward abortion may be: a) it is, in itself, 
morally acceptable or at least neutral - simply a matter of personal choice; b) it 
is morally justified in some exceptional circumstances, and hence is legally 
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appropriate in those circumstances; c) where it is morally unjustified, it may still 
be inappropriate or impossible to punish someone. 
Certainly, "a" is not an option for law: law cannot be indifferent to the rights of 
helpless human beings. But given this, it seems plausible at the present juncture 
that public policy should allow the following classes of abortion, based on "b" 
and "c". First, when the mother's life is directly at stake. This falls under category 
"b", and the consensus in Roman Catholic moral theology is that the death of the 
unborn in these cases is not direct abortion at all, but only indirect. 19 Second, if 
"there is a serious threat to her physical health and to the length of her life."20 
Some would argue that these would also fall under category "b" and could be 
understood to involve only indirect abortion. At very least, however, they would 
fall under category "c", where punishment would be inappropriate. Third, in 
cases of rape or incest abortions are not morally justified, but should fit under 
category "c" which again recognizes that extraordinary circumstances preclude 
punishment: political prudence is not individual prudence, and the state cannot 
practically legislate in such exceptional and tragic cases where values conflict and 
there is no real possibility of a consensus being formed. Fourth, as Richard 
McCormick says, "where fetal deformity is of such magnitude that life-
supporting efforts would not be considered obligatory after birth."21 Some 
theologians would put this under category "b" and understand the termination of 
the pregnancy to simply be justified withdrawal of life support. Even if this 
argument is recognized as being shaky (as it probably is), such an abortion 
arguably may still fall under category "c". 
Three. In the case of other classes of abortion that might be allowed (under 
category "c") such as abortions early in the first trimester of unwed teenagers, the 
law's pedagogical purpose should dictate informed consent, which would be 
obtained by mandating a short waiting period before the abortion coupled with 
counselling and the dissemination of information about fetal development and 
alternatives to the abortion. There could also be a public campaign designed to 
discourage abortions. Provision should also be made so that the unborn have an 
advocate to argue against the abortion. This position assumes the unassailable: 
that the fetus is a human being and most probably a human person from very 
early on in the pregnancy, and yet cannot speak for itself. 
Four. No matter what the legal status of abortion may be, public funding for 
abortion is constitutionally as well as morally intolerable: it interferes with the 
free practice of religion by demanding that one's tax money be used for a practice 
directly contrary to the public beliefs of one's faith. In other words, it violates the 
civil liberties guaranteed by the constitution, most notably those touching on the 
free and uncoerced exercise of religion. Also, as David Carlin points out, "A 
constitutional right does not necessarily entail a right to public funding for the 
exercise of that right. In rare cases it does"22 (the right to counsel). Just because I 
have a right to freedom of speech does not mean that the government must 
provide me with a right to freedom of speech does not mean that the government 
must provide me with a printing press. 
Five. The "pro-life" strategy of giving the states more freedom to regulate 
abortion is highly questionable. The result of such a strategy would be a situation 
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in which different, perhaps adjoining states, would have radically different 
abortion laws. The constant cat-and-dog fights that would take place in the fifty 
states would result in permanent instability of abortion, with the ensuing 
deleterious effects noted above. The strategy should rather be to begin building a 
consensus in our society over at least the most morally unacceptable cases of 
abortion - and one does that through debate and dialogue, not confrontation. 
When such a consensus is reached, Congress should make the legislative policy, 
not the courts, and not the states. This is the only way to ensure both consistency 
and stability in abortion law. At the same time "pro-life" efforts should be 
expended on making abortion unnecessary for as many women as possible. 
Six. In regard to civil disobedience, the main criterion that the "pro-life" 
movement must consider is one of effectiveness, that is, what types of actions in 
the long run will save more unborn life? And I would argue that there is no 
question that only when a consensus is reached in our society as a whole with 
regard to the most morally objectionable types of abortion can large numbers of 
young human lives be saved, many more than are saved by acts of civil 
disobedience. If blocking abortion clinics or harassing abortionists or those 
having abortions only has the effect of increasing the polarization of our society, 
such consensus becomes ever more of an impossibility. 
Conclusion 
These reflections are meant to point out the complexities of the relation 
between civil law and moral issues, complexities that are particularly acute in the 
case of abortion. Perhaps if the distinction developed in this article can be seen as 
cogent by both "pro-life" and "pro-choice" advocates, the beginnings of a 
consensus on public policy can be reached. This may be a first step to the deeper 
moral consensus that we all desire. 
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